Over the past few decades, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have proliferated globally.
most RTAs, if not all, are driven more about the need to trade small economic losses for major political and strategic gains. 9 Offering zero tariffs to everyone at the WTO, however, would not score any political gains for most countries, as the WTO has become so large that it includes the friends and rivals of almost every country.
The second option sees the WTO as an RTA 'confessor'. 10 If we think of preferential treatment as a cardinal sin in the religion of free trade, the 'terminator' would wipe out those sins by eliminating the preferences. Under the second option, countries might seek, through 'confession', to alleviate their guilt even if they cannot wipe out their sins. According to this view, the WTO could, first, provide objective research to help better understand the impact of RTAs on non-Members; secondly, set up a negotiating forum for the coordination/standardization/harmonization of rules of origin 11 , and, thirdly, draft 'best practices' or model RTAs 12 to minimize the effect of further fragmentation created by different breeds of RTAs. However, there are several reasons why this approach is not entirely satisfactory:
First, while the authors agree that the WTO would be the best institution to examine the pros and cons of different RTAs in the general sense, critical findings on particular RTAs would make the WTO (Secretariat) vulnerable to criticisms of infringing upon
Member's rights to conclude RTAs under Article XXIV, and allegations of breaching the impartiality of the WTO and the Secretariat. Moreover, as it will be politically incorrect for the WTO to outsource such research to external researchers, the WTO most likely approach might not work. One possible solution to this is to draft 'best practices' or a model RTA in such a way that different options for a given rule are provided for potential RTAs to choose from. The danger, however, is that a country would simply choose the worst possible combinations resulting in a 'Frankenstein' RTA to defeat the very purpose of having such best practices in the first place.
Yet another option offered is to turn the WTO into an 'inquisitor' by strengthening the existing WTO monitoring system. The 2006 rules on transparency is a recent example of this 18 . Unfortunately, because the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) is hamstrung by the consensus rule, merely having heightened monitoring rules would not be of much practical use here.
In this article, we discuss a fourth option, i.e., to make the WTO an 'enforcer' by using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a venue for resolving at least some disputes among RTA parties, and possibly even disputes between RTA and non-RTA WTO members. In a certain sense, this option complements rather than replaces the previous options. The rationale underlying this initiative is that, by using the WTO dispute settlement system for some RTA disputes, the Members will be able to develop, albeit gradually, incrementally and pragmatically, a body of 'common law' on RTAs. Such a body of common principles could form the basis of multilateral rules on RTAs or harmonize RTA rules. This could minimize the harmful effect of RTAs.
In order to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a 'common good' for RTAs, we have to answer three further questions:
First, can we use the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate at least some RTA disputes?
Second, which rules can the WTO apply in RTA disputes?
Third, how can we equip the WTO machinery to deal with RTA disputes?
18 Warwick Report, above n 2, at 52.
In this article, we try to provide some preliminary thinking on these matters in the hope that our suggestions will trigger greater discussion about how the WTO could become more relevant given the current invasion of RTAs.
I. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY JURISDICTION
Can the WTO dispute settlement system be used to address disputes arising from RTAs?
Consider two scenarios. The first concerns the power of the WTO Dispute Settlement Most of these are pre-conditions that an RTA must satisfy before its Members could invoke GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V to justify its deviation from the MFN 46 There seems to be a reluctance, at the very least, on the WTO's side to press the comity argument too far. The third is to apply non-WTO rules as norms that create substantive, rather than procedural, rights and obligations. As we have discussed earlier, under the current WTO regime, non-WTO norms cannot be invoked as basis for staking out claims in a dispute;
instead, their only possible substantive use would be as defense against claims of violation or justification for adopting measures which are inconsistent with WTO obligations. This is the hardest of the three scenarios, and it is also where the real controversy lies.
This third scenario can be analyzed at two levels: first, whether such non-WTO norms could be invoked by parties and applied by panels at all; second, even if they could be invoked despite running against WTO norms (which would typically be the case as otherwise the party invoking them would have relied on some WTO provision instead), whether they may prevail against WTO norms. Just as private contracts are automatically born into a system of domestic law, so treaties are automatically born into the system of international law. Much the way private contracts do not need to list all the relevant legislative and administrative provisions of domestic law for them to be applicable to the contract, so treaties need not explicitly set out rules of general international law for them to be applicable to the treaty. 67 Pauwelyn, above n 58, at 1001. 68 Appellate Body Report, US -Gasoline, above n 64, at 17. 69 Pauwelyn, above n 58, at 1001.
However, this argument is probably not as strong as it might at first appear. An initial objection may be dealt with swiftly. First, the basic assumption underlying Pauwelyn's analogy has to do with the degree of similarity between domestic and international legal systems. The analogy is not altogether unproblematic. As Philip Allott puts it, the international legal system still lacks 'most of the essential characteristics of their national legal systems'. 70 Assuming however that such an analogy is sustainable in the present case, the real reason behind the parties' decision to enter into private contracts is not because they want to incorporate general contract rules, but because they want to vary the default rules between them absent explicit provisions in each individual contract. obligation. 72 The usual answer is that this is the whole point of the DSU. Yet what this paper tries to show is that the answer is not as simple as it seems. There may yet be further trade obligations undertaken outside the WTO which are subject to rules concerning their breach and the consequences of such breach which stand in uneasy relation to the WTO rules on dispute settlement. Third, even accepting that 'treaties are automatically born into the system of international law' just like private contracts, 73 As important as the distinction is between Panel jurisdiction (WTO claims only) and applicable law (potentially all international law), so too is the distinction between interpreting WTO rules (and the prohibition to add or detract from those rules in the process) and examining WTO claims in the context of other applicable international law (where the expression of state consent and conflict rules of international law must decide the outcome). This leads us to the third point, i.e., for those RTAs which either do not provide for formal dispute settlement, or which do provide a dispute settlement system which is however not compulsory, the very fact that members to such RTAs intentionally chose to shun the WTO dispute settlement system, or any dispute settlement system for that matter, probably means that they never intended to make such an agreement enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement system. If, however, the panel follows Pauwelyn's advice and decides to drag a member into a formal WTO dispute settlement proceeding, that is clearly an infringement upon the sovereign rights of a member which never intended to be held to account in the WTO for breaches of its obligations under these non-WTO treaties.
Assuming, arguendo, that the RTA rules could be invoked in WTO disputes, should such rules, to the extent that they are inconsistent with WTO norms, prevail over WTO rules? For many public international lawyers, the answer seems to be yes when one applies the two familiar rules for resolving treaty conflicts, i.e., lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali. 81 The arguments are that, first, because the RTAs are concluded after the WTO agreements have been concluded, they are later rules and must prevail over prior rules; second, because the RTAs are special rules which are created on top of the general rules under the WTO agreements, the RTA rules must prevail as well. Again, however, the issues are not that simple. First of all, as we all know, the WTO rules are for RTAs -what we might tentatively call the 'public international law of trade.'
In this regard, we think it would be worthwhile as a practical matter to make the WTO at least an optional forum for the RTA parties so that the WTO could contribute to the development of such a body of 'common law', and that in this way, under the stewardship of the Appellate Body, the law will in time work itself pure. 83 . But if the WTO were to serve such a function, the current DSU may require amendment so that The idea that there are multiple options to the compulsory settlement of international disputes is hardly novel.
The traditional difficulty with subjecting diplomatic dispute over various subjects to compulsory dispute settlement was the principle of sovereign choice. Sovereigns choose how they would have their disputes resolved. But one option that had been revived from antiquity during the nineteenth century is international arbitration. The commission established under the 1794 Jay Treaty was one such example, 84 and arbitration was given renewed impetus with the Alabama Claims (or 'Geneva') arbitration. 85 The idea of compulsory jurisdiction may be traced to this but at present has been muddled with the idea of exclusive jurisdiction.
Exclusive compulsory dispute settlement is only a subset. meant to foreclose the doctrine of sovereign choice. Is that true?
Viewed carefully, the difficulty in the modern RTA context involves conflicts of jurisdiction, not a failure of compulsory dispute settlement. True, the problem is particularly acute in light of the widespread appreciation post-Uruguay Round that trade disputes would be semi-automatically submitted to WTO dispute settlement. In other words, the problem arises because RTAs threaten to undermine the WTO dispute settlement process. But we have seen that unless an uncompromising stance is taken in the name of WTO law, there is no clear prohibition of a future treaty prevailing over an earlier treaty, at least in terms of international law doctrine. The same applies in the case of a more specific treaty rule prevailing over a general rule.
It might be thought that the practical problem arises because arbitrators tasked with settling an RTA dispute might not recognize the WTO's jurisdiction as prevailing over their own. This has some legal justification in arbitration law. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz had been established for far longer than it has been in WTO jurisprudence. 87 Arbitrators are liable to fail to comprehend why WTO dispute settlement should somehow constitute an exception to a well known arbitral doctrine.
Put differently, if arbitrators can rely on the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine against national courts, why would they be precluded from doing so against WTO dispute settlement?
One neat solution may be to channel the actual handling of WTO disputes to the WTO dispute settlement process itself. In cases where it is particularly unclear whether a WTO or RTA rule controls the dispute, the idea of having the choice of court process settled in advance of the choice of law issue seems particularly attractive. Practical wisdom might also suggest that if you put the issue before the right 'forum', the 'right'
Melbourne Journal of International Law 313 (2005) (discussing the continued salience of the sovereign choice doctrine amongst Southeast Asian nations). 87 A question arises concerning the extent to which an inter-party dispute in a modern FTA (as opposed, for example, to an investor-state dispute) may be said to result in an arbitral award, and more to the point is to be considered 'arbitration' in the first place. It might be argued that they are no more 'arbitration' than the WTO dispute settlement procedure. To help the WTO carry out this task, we suggest the following as a possible starting point for deeper reflection on the issues:
(1) The DSU should be amended to provide the possibility for RTA members to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve their RTA disputes. To provide the legal basis for this, Members to an RTA should insert the following clause on dispute settlement in their RTAs:
We agree that we shall refer all relevant disputes under this agreement to the WTO dispute settlement body. The WTO dispute settlement body shall have the exclusive competence to decide whether a dispute constitutes a relevant dispute for the purposes of the present provision. A ruling on a relevant dispute by the WTO dispute settlement body shall be considered binding before any arbitral or other dispute settlement body or procedure established pursuant to the present Agreement.
Correspondingly, Appendix 1 of the DSU could be amended to include the following:
The applicability of this Understanding to the Regional Trade Agreements of Members ('the individual agreement') shall be subject to the adoption of a decision by the parties to the individual agreement setting out the terms for the application of this Understanding to such agreements, including any special or additional rules or procedures for inclusion in Appendix 2, as notified to the DSB.
(2) In order to facilitate the adjudication of RTA disputes by the panel or AB, any RTA which adopts the WTO dispute settlement system should also grant the panel and
Appellate Body the powers to decide on the following two issues: First, whether the RTA fully complies with the requirements under GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V. To the extent that an RTA cannot be justified, the Members will not be allowed to invoke the RTA as a defense against non-compliance of their relevant WTO obligations. Second, whether or not the RTA affects the interests of non-Members. To the extent that it does, such non-Member shall be given the opportunity to join in the dispute as well. (6) If a party to a dispute is not satisfied with the ruling of the panel, it shall have a right to appeal the report to the Appellate Body.
V. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
(7) To avoid the diversion of resources from the current responsibilities and functions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body, the expenses for a case from an RTA should be funded by the RTA members involved in such dispute. Special and differential treatment could be provided to RTA Members which are developing countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have discussed the possibility of using the WTO dispute settlement system as a common good for RTA disputes. In answering this question, we have separated the doctrinal analysis from our recommendations for reform, i.e., what could be done to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a common good for RTA disputes under the WTO legal framework as it stands, versus how the current WTO legal framework should be changed to make it more useful. While we believe that it is desirable to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve RTA disputes, we also believe that there are significant uncertainties under the current WTO legal framework. Ideally, that framework should be amended. By confronting the conflict between the current WTO dispute settlement rules and RTA disputes in a direct manner, we have avoided the temptation to twist the current rules to achieve the result we want. In our view, such shortcuts create false hope for those who believe that the WTO dispute settlement system has a role to play in RTA disputes. It also threatens the integrity and legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole by trying to feed it with something which it cannot readily digest, resulting in congestion and possibly a great combustion of the WTO dispute settlement system.
While we recommend that a new treaty rule should be undertaken on a plurilateral basis, WTO members which might encounter difficulty in signing on to the new regime should nonetheless be allowed to bring their RTA conflicts to WTO dispute settlement by way of special agreement instead. This additional flexibility has in any case proven extremely useful in the context of disputes before the ICJ. 
